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1). Discerning judgment 
A Democratic Theory of Judgment collects, synthesises and supplements arguments 
that Linda Zerilli has been making over the last decade or so.1 As in her earlier 
critique of feminist poststructuralism, Zerilli casts doubt on the idea that issues of 
criteria, evaluation, and cross-cultural understanding are best thought of in terms of 
getting a better epistemological stance on things. Indeed, the overwhelming message 
of her discussion is that issues of judgment are not best framed in epistemological 
terms at all, at least not as long as that means thinking in terms of searching for 
transcendent criteria of some sort. A recurring theme of Zerilli’s work, in this book 
and her previous writings, is that problems of foundationalism are often misconstrued 
in liberal, republican and radical traditions of political thought. Building on the 
arguments of Stanley Cavell, she affirms that post-foundationalism does not involve 
somehow controlling for the dizzying vertigo that follows from the disappearance of 
epistemological certainty. Rather, the critique of foundationalism is an invitation to 
learn to live with the fact that the world of human affairs is not only held together by 
relationships of knowledge - whether of certainty or contingency. 
	
Zerilli describes herself as a “feminist critic of strict cognitivist models of politics” (p. 
240), and as such it is not a surprise that she engages with the recent affective turn in 
critical thought, both in cultural theory and in political theory alike.2 The turn to affect 
is, in no small part, an explicit rejection of the tenets of meaning-centric 
poststructuralist theories that she has previously criticised for their residual 
attachments to epistemological scepticism.3 Zerilli’s locates the outbreak of affect 
theory in a broader line of thought that seeks to avoid excessively intellectualist 
images of action, ones that think of “all aspects of human thought and action in terms 
of cognition” (p. 240). One of her more important insights is to suggest that there is a 
fundamental divide between two different ways of avoiding intellectualism, two 
different approaches to rethinking the relations between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing 
how’. There are, as she puts it, “better and worse ways of arguing the anti-
intellectualist case” (p. 241). It is to a tradition indebted to ordinary language 
philosophy that she appeals, in order to redeem phenomenological approaches and 
certain strands of the philosophy of mind, in preference to the styles of ontological 
trumping that tend to characterise theories of affect. As she puts it, “ordinary language 
philosophy offers a ways to refute intellectualism without sliding into a 
philosophically debatable and politically fraught nonconceptualism” (p. 241). Zerilli 
asserts that, if read properly, both ordinary language philosophy and existential 
phenomenology “show not only that propositional intentionality is entangled in and 
unthinkable apart from practical intentionality but also that there is no sharp line 
between unarticulated knowing how and explicit knowledge” (p. 247). On the face of 
it, this might not sound that path-breaking, until one notices that the assertion of sharp 
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dividing lines between affect and meaning, feeling and cognition, is in fact quite 
central to a whole series of contemporary strands of thought, including cultural 
theories of affect, psychological theories of basic emotions, and social science 
interpretations of neuroscience.  
 
Zerilli has engaged with the relevance of neurobiology to political analysis before.4 In 
this book she places her analysis of affect theory in a broader context of debates about 
cognitive and noncognitive approaches to action, intentionality and normativity. It is 
this aspect of the book I want to dwell upon here. I want to draw into view some 
similarities and differences between Zerilli’s argument against strong interpretations 
of the autonomy of affect with the arguments developed by what I will for 
convenience sake call the ‘nonsite school’ of cultural criticism; and I want to draw 
attention to what is a distinctive style of conceptual criticism that Zerilli pursues in 
developing her own view of judgement.  
 
2). Aspects of intentionality  
In Zerilli’s view, the affective turn in critical theory raises the problem of how to 
think about the entanglement of affect and conceptual rationality. She is surely correct 
that this is an important question, although she might be being rather charitable in this 
judgment. It is actually the criticism levelled at the simplistic dualisms underlying 
nonrepresentational theories of affective embodiment that has flushed out this issue as 
a problem worthy of further consideration. As she herself effectively shows, in most if 
not all accounts of affect theory the relationship between affect and rationality is 
normally presented as already having been settled, in a clear order of causal priority in 
favour of affect over rationality. Zerilli develops an effective critique of the ways in 
which affect theory holds fast to a strong separation of the conceptual and 
nonconceptual, thought and action, cognition and affect, a style of thinking that is 
most clearly evident in the recourse to ‘layer-cake’ images of the priority of the latter 
over the former.  
 
In developing this critique, Zerilli affirms significant parts of the criticism of affect 
theory developed by Ruth Leys.5 She also registers a significant disagreement with 
the implied direction of Leys’ own critique. One area where Zerilli converges with 
Leys is around the issue of disagreement. As Zerilli points out, from a noncognitivist 
position (of which affect theory would count as one example amongst others) - where 
evaluations are is all about feeling and subjective preferences cut off from a realm of 
objectivity - “disagreement about values” (p. 12) is not strictly possible (p. 12). For 
Zerilli, disagreement necessarily has an intentional character: “We can and do ask if a 
particular valuational response is appropriate to its object” (p. 16). In this concern 
with the ways in which noncognitivism elides the possibility of disagreement by 
cutting evaluation off from any intentional orientation to a realm of objectivity, Zerilli 
is largely in accord with the position articulated by Leys in her own critique of affect 
theory. Leys holds that advocates of the autonomy of affect are unable to take 
normative stances because, from their perspective, differences of feeling are just that 
– mere differences, not disagreements about a shared world. What most concerns 
Leys is the way in which affect theory evacuates the social field of any possibility of 
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argument and debate. In essence, affect theory proposes that one cannot argue or 
disagree – about the meaning of a text or a political issue – because what people feel 
is not open to rational justification. Affect theory reduces normative values into 
merely personal tastes.6   
 
The concern with defending the possibility of disagreement as the very core of 
theories of intentionality and interpretation is a defining theme of the ‘nonsite school’ 
of cultural criticism with which to Leys’ work is associated.7 Leys’ argument, both 
against cultural theories of affect and her broader genealogy of the sciences of 
emotions, is broadly in accord with the arguments of literary theorists including 
Walter Benn Michaels and Todd Cronan, who have challenged the terms in which 
affect, feeling and emotions have been presented as fundamentally undermining any 
concern with intentionality in the analysis of cultural forms from literature, painting to 
photography. For these thinkers, appeals to the causal power of affect and feeling 
have the effect of closing down any space not just of intentionality but also therefore 
of interpretation.8 As Cronan puts it, “Without an appeal to intention – trying to 
understand what someone meant by something (a sign, a mark, a gesture, a sound, a 
word, an idea) - there are no grounds for disagreement”.9 Claims about the affective 
dimensions of art, or literature, or ‘media’ in general, are concerned not with 
interpretation or meaning, but with what happens to subjects of experience. The 
assertion of the sensory immediacy of affects means that questions of interpretation - 
and therefore the possibility of disagreement - become moot.  
 
While Zerilli shares this concern with reaffirming the importance of disagreement to 
political action, she is rather wary of the precise direction in which Leys takes her 
critique of affect theory. She suggests, with some fairness I think, that what is missing 
from Leys’ critique is an understanding “of the temptation to embrace 
nonconceptuality as the only adequate response to intellectualism” (p. 251).10 That 
might be so, and Zerilli is right to give credit to the animating concern with 
understanding the ‘tenacity’ of oppressive social norms. But the more substantive 
concern that Zerilli has with Leys’ critique of affect theory is with the implicit 
account of intentionality it appears to invoke. Zerilli worries that Leys seeks to 
reassert a notion of intentionality as concept possession, a notion she is herself 
concerned in this book to complicate. As she puts it, a critical response to affect 
theory “must do more than reaffirm intentionality – the relation to thought to its 
objects – in one or other of the ways now familiar in the philosophy of mind” (p. 
260). This issue – how to theorise intentionality - is, I think, an important cleavage 
amongst critics of affect theory – and it is certainly the case that much of the work 
associated with the ‘nonsite school’ is primarily focussed upon redeeming a rather 
traditional concept of artistic intentionality, one in which intentionality is closely 
associated with claims to objective truth.  
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Zerilli’s position that we do not ‘cognize’ evaluative facts is certainly at odds with the 
strong account of aesthetic intentionality defended by writers such as Michaels and 
Cronan. She holds that this affirmation need not lead to pure noncogntive approach to 
judgment. She argues that feelings and affects are ‘world-giving’ as she puts it, 
“bound up with discovering the facts and thus with rational ways of judging” (p. 15). 
This formulation actually has some close affinities with the account of embodied 
rationality that Leys has herself recently affirmed, in her endorsement of the 
‘embodied world taking cognitivism’ presented by the philosopher Phil Hutchinson.11 
As Leys puts it, “The resulting account of emotions is a cognitivism that emphasizes 
the ways in which humans and other animals are alive to aspects of the world – not to 
the disenchanted world of the modern natural sciences that stands external to minds, 
but to cognitivized, conceptualized world.” (p. 132). My point is not that Zerilli and 
Leys are in complete agreement. But by reading them alongside each other, it 
becomes clear that between them they might well be redefining the philosophical 
territory upon which the relevance of affective dimensions of action and their 
relationship to rationality should be concerned; more specifically, both consider the 
debate between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus over rationality and mindedness 
to be the place where the key issues are most clearly elaborated.12 
  
3). Logical geographies of action 
In her treatment of the implications of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate for political 
theory, and in other dimensions of her argument in A Democratic Theory of 
Judgment, one can see a distinctive style of conceptual analysis at work in Zerilli’s 
own thinking. It is one in which she consistently seeks to reconfigure the temporal 
and spatial imaginations at work in different strands of political theory. In a number 
of chapters in the book, Zerilli outlines how discussions of judgment are often 
wrapped up in accounts of how to understand the values of different cultures or 
different identities. There is certainly a strong association between the idea that 
judgment is as a matter of subsuming particulars under universal concepts that are 
already agreed upon, and the idea that one cannot comprehend or should not even 
presume to judge what is foreign or unfamiliar to one’s own experience. The resulting 
worry about relativism arises, she argues, from mistaking the challenge of making 
judgments in situations of practical action for the ability to provide philosophically 
fool proof principles for such judgments in any context – this is another variant of the 
epistemological assumption that action must be firmly grounded in certain 
knowledge. Zerilli proposes that relativism is a false problem, one that arises from 
remaining captive to the wrong picture of how it is possible to share a world together 
with others. It is a picture in which the idea of judgment as the rule governed 
application of agreed standards leads either to interminable worries that particular 
perspectives will undermine the very possibility of judging or to the ethnocentric 
disavowal of judging in the face of various scruples about giving offence. 
 
It is here, in the treatment of how judgment across different perspectives is to be 
imagined, that Zerilli’s elaboration of Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the political 
becomes important. Zerilli argues that judgment should be thought of as inherently 
political not in the sense that it is necessarily about explicitly political topics, nor in 
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the sense that it involves expressing one’s own opinions, but in the sense that it 
involves addressing oneself to others. Thinking of judgment in this way requires us to 
think of the use of criteria as “fundamentally anticipatory rather than antecedent 
(justificatory) in structure” (p. 183). In making this conceptual move, Zerilli switches 
the temporal register in which issues of judgment are presented, and, in so doing, she 
also refashions the image of the space across which the application of criteria is 
projected. Judgments are now to be understood as claims addressed to others in 
anticipation of some sort of response, without either knowing in advance the form of 
such a response or being able to compel assent. Judgment is thereby reconfigured as a 
performative act of opening and sustaining social interaction, of affirming a shared 
world.13  
 
The recasting of the spatial pictures through which issues of judgment, intentionality 
and normativity are discussed is, to my eye at least, a recurrent feature in Zerilli’s 
book. Throughout the book, Zerilli argues that the apparent problems of pluralism, 
relativism, and subjectivism arise from particular ways of framing the relations 
between the cognitive and the non-cognitive, the conceptual and the nonconceptual, 
meaning and affect (e.g. pp. 10-17). Across otherwise very different traditions of 
thought, for example, she finds a recurring attachment to bifurcated models of mind 
that lead to the idea that values are purely subjective (in either good ways or bad 
ways) and that affective states are purely noncognitive. In short, Zerilli is concerned 
with refashioning the ‘logical geographies’ that characterise the conceptual frames 
that shape discussion of human action.14 By this, I mean that she attends to the ways 
in which relations between insides and outsides, or between different systems, or 
between distinct processes are imagined. Indeed, paying careful attention to the 
logical geographies of theories of action might be taken to be a defining characteristic 
of the strand of ordinary philosophising with which Zerilli identifies, in contrast to 
the assertive ontologizing that characterises affect theory. So, for example, in her 
engagement with the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, Zerilli alights in particular upon the 
subtext to that debate, which revolves around the ways in which spatial metaphors are 
mobilized by both sides. Dreyfus talks about upper floors and lower floors, and 
McDowell’s work reconfigures ideas of inside and outside to reconfigure mind-body 
relations in his argument that perception is conceptual ‘all the way out’.15 Zerilli’s 
argument, specifically in relation to Dreyfus’s critique of ‘mentalism’ in accounts of 
embodied rationality, is that what one might think of as the vertical spatialization of 
concepts leads to a series of misunderstandings and prevents a more nuanced, non-
reductive understanding of the ways in which affect and conceptuality are entangled. 
The combination of an architectural vocabulary of levels with a vocabulary of 
temporal priority of embodied feelings over rational thought is the recurrent rhetorical 
feature of a whole genre of affect theory, and it connects it with a much broader 
public discourse of psychologised neuro-commentary. 
 
One can find this attention to the spatial grammar of theories of action, embodiment, 
and rationality in different parts of Zerilli’s argument in A Democratic Theory of 
Judgment. For example, a pivotal theme running throughout the book, one that 
connects the Arendtian theme of ‘representative thinking’ with the discussion of 
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issues of cognitivism and noncognitivism, is how to understand the idea of 
perspective. Drawing on James Conant’s work, Zerilli reasserts the ordinary sense 
that perspective refers to the idea that objects take on different appearances depending 
on the angle from which they are viewed. Far from being ruinous of the possibility of 
a sense of a shared objective world, Zerilli argues that any distortion arising from any 
given perspective can be corrected by taking on board other perspectives. The crucial 
philosophical point here is that perspectives are always “perspectives on something” 
(p. 267). Far from ruining a sense of objectivity, Zerilli argues that the very possibility 
of sharing an objective world depend upon plural perspectives, an argument that 
overlaps with Arendt’s account of what it is to share in a common world: “Rather than 
as serving as reminders of a limit, of our confinement in our human-all-too-human 
modes of subjectivity, perspective and affective interpretations are now taken to be 
the very means by which we can overcome the restrictions on seeing how things 
actually stand in the world that may be associated with our particular location in it” 
(p. 32-33).  
 
Zerilli’s redemption of the ordinary sense of perspective, in order to affirm an 
understanding of embodied, affectively imbued intentionality, suggests that the 
possibility of speaking of a shared world arises not from abstracting upwards – 
vertically - from particular contexts towards some sort of context-transcendent 
principles of judgment, but by moving between perspectives in one way or another – 
horizontally, as it were. And to follow through on this conceptual move requires an 
additional imaginative adjustment. The identification of vertiginous relativism as a 
problem generated by affirming plural perspectives follows from holding fast to a 
picture in which it is assumed that belonging to a particular culture or being located in 
a particular context is to find oneself enclosed within a tightly bounded conceptual 
schema of some sort. But Zerilli argues, citing Steven Affeldt to the effect that “a 
context is not a room” (p. 149), that context is not best imagined as either a figure for 
the threat of pure contingency, nor as a last resort guarantor of determinative 
meaning. Rather, she endorses Stanley Cavell’s much cited account of the projection 
of meanings learnt in one situation into new contexts16, underscoring again the central 
Arendtian theme of initiation, beginning – of natality – in Zerilli’s conceptual 
reconfiguration of issues of action. On these grounds, it turns out that context is best 
thought of as a figure of openness and creativity (as Derrida taught us too).  
 
Zerilli’s account of the political stakes of contemporary philosophical debates about 
embodiment, intentionality, normativity and rationality is, in short, characterised by a 
particular style of criticism, one which attends closely to the spatial and temporal 
ordering of concepts. In developing an account in which the possibility of judgment is 
made conditional on the capacity to project meanings into new contexts which is not 
guaranteed in advance, Zerilli’s book is best located within a broader movement of 
resurgent social theories of action and re-socialized philosophies of practical reason 
that promise a route beyond the shared epistemic hang-ups of poststructuralist 
theories of signification and ontologies of affect alike.17  
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